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The Work of Art and Truth of Being as “Historical”:
Reading Being and Time, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” and the “Turn”
(Kehre) in Heidegger’s Philosophy of the 1930s
I. Introducing the Topics of Art, The Event of Being, and the Historical Moment of
Heidegger’s Philosophical “Turn” (Kehre) of the 1930s
Reading Heidegger’s Being and Time, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” and the 1934-35 lecture
courses Hölderlin’s Hymns“Germania” and “The Rhine,” the aim of this essay is twofold.
First, it attempts to elucidate the manner in which the work of art functions as a superlative event
of “truth-happening” (aletheia), which facilitates the movement of Dasein into the truth of Being
as a legitimate member of a community, serving as the origin of culture’s appropriation of their
own unique historical destiny. Second, it explains why this notion of art as the historical
manifestation of Being is crucial to understanding the shift, or “turn” (Kehre), in Heidegger’s
philosophy of the 1930s and 1940s, i.e., it examines the philosophical problems Heidegger
rectified when moving from Being and Time, and the conceptual-linguistic constraints of
metaphysics and the subject-centered model of Dasein, to the later works on art and poetry. This
analysis of the work of art and the Hölderlin lectures focuses on writings that Heidegger
produced during the 1930s, a period known as the “turn.” Thus, a brief explanation of this
“turning” in Heidegger’s thought will enhance the reader’s understanding of the importance this
had on Heidegger’s philosophy during this historical moment.
In Heidegger scholarship the “turn” refers to a specific historical period marking an event
in the development of Heidegger’s thought. As James Risser states, “[The turn] designates a
period in his life that begins immediately after the publication of Being and Time in 1927 and
can be said to end with the work of Nietzsche that consumes Heidegger around the outbreak of
World War II.”1 To refer to the turn as an event, or drastic change in Heidegger’s philosophy of
the 1930s, not only suggests that there is a change in the way Heidegger approaches, formulates,
and presents his thought, but further suggests that there is a drastic shift in focus during this time,
which amounts to the radical change in his fundamental philosophical topic. Thus conceived, the
turn represents Heidegger’s leap from Man to Being, a move from seeking the meaning of Being
by way of the human Dasein to the search for the truth of Being at Dasein’s exclusion. This
suggests that Heidegger during the 1930s, at the exclusion of Dasein, embarks (for the first time)
on a full-blown ontological enquiry into Being as such.
This is not the case, however, as is evident from Heidegger’s remarks in the essay,
“Letter on Humanism” (1947). When reflecting on the turning in his philosophy from Being and
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Time to Time and Being, he claims that the central topic and subject-matter of his enquiry from
Being and Time does not change. “This turning is not a change of standpoint from Being and
Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of
which Being and Time is examined, that is to say, experienced from the fundamental experience
of the oblivion of Being.”2 Heidegger’s philosophy from Being and Time onwards is marked by
a reorientation to the problem of how the Being-event occurs, which includes the consideration
of a variety of new and unique paradigms. “This reorientation,” states Thomas Sheehan, “is not
due to Heidegger alteration, much less abandoning or surrendering the philosophical task he set
forth in Being and Time.”3 Rather, he is expanding the question of Being through a renewed
approach and presentation of the fundamental topic.
There are several significant aspects of the “turn” and the renewed approach to his project
which will be detailed in this essay. First, Heidegger comes to realize that the event of Being
cannot be adequately understood from the limited, individuated perspective of Dasein (as solus
ipse [alone itself]), and identifies the problem that his model of Dasein in Being and Time, as the
transcendental-temporal locus for understanding the meaning of Being, poses. For it is indeed
possible to associate Heidegger’s model with the subject-centered understanding of the human
being found in both Kant’s transcendental thought and the traditional metaphysics of Descartes,
i.e., a notion of the human subject grounded in the interior-exterior/subject-object dichotomy.
Heidegger attempts to address this problem through the “de-centering” of Dasein in the later
works on art and poetry, which he feels will allow for “the adequate execution and completion”
of another form of philosophical thinking that “abandons subjectivity,” and which originates
“from the fundamental experience of the oblivion of Being.”4 However, this is not to indicate
that Heidegger abandons Dasein in the process of the inquiry, but rather as Risser correctly
argues, “Heidegger’s realization provided a shift in the emphasis from an analysis of the Being
of Dasein to the analysis of the event of Being itself - that occurs in the ‘there’ (Da) of Dasein.”
Second, this realization inspires the move beyond the linguistic-conceptual constraints of
metaphysics (e.g., the traditional philosophical categories of the existentiell-ontic-historical and
the existential-ontological-ahistorical), which includes the move to pursue alternative paradigms
in order to understand the truth of Being, or how Being comes-to-presence.
In all of Heidegger’s later works on art and poetry, the consideration of art is intimately
linked with the question of Dasein’s authentic historical existence as a communal being.
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Corresponding to this shift in paradigms and the move beyond metaphysics, a new style and
approach to the presentation of his philosophy appear. During the turn, his writings become more
akin to poetry (as Dichtung), than the methodological academic philosophy of Being and Time.
Analyzing the development in Heidegger’s philosophy, namely, the emergence of the language
of “poietic saying,” Daniela Vallega-Neu describes Heidegger’s linguistic-conceptual leap over
the problematic “metaphysical” issues, such as the ontological distinction and the notion of
Dasein’s transcendence, as he moves beyond Being and Time, which is perhaps most evident in
Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy: On Ereignis (1936-37). As Vallega-Nue elucidates,
the move, or leap, beyond the constraints of the metaphysical subject-centered model of Dasein
happens by means of a literal transformation of language, specifically, “the transformation from
a propositional (presentative) language to a poietic (in the sense of the Greek word poiesis)
saying.”5 Propositional language in all cases speaks about the things (entities) it addresses in a
way that sets up a relationship of opposition between a thinking or presenting subject, whereas
poietic language is already speaking from out of an immersion in Being, “poietic saying brings
beyng [Being] forth in the saying as it finds it itself enowned by beyng’s [Being’s] event. Poietic
saying thus is part of beyng’s (Being’s) event as beyng’s (Being’s) event occurs in the poietic
saying.”6
It is the aim of this essay to interpret the manner in which art opens and readies Dasein
for its authentic communal and historical Being, i.e., its authentic historicality. This event occurs
in the “work-being” of the great work of art as the Ereignis, the lighting and clearing event of
truth’s happening (aletheia), the temporal event of appropriation of the historical destining of
Being, which is facilitated by Dasein’s participation in and preservation of the great work of art.
Therefore, this essay, which is primarily focused on the truth-potential of the great work of art to
facilitate the event of Being’s disclosure, also works to rethink Heidegger’s subject-centered
reading of Dasein as it appears in Being and Time, as an authentically communal being, in
relation to the work of art and the truth of Being as a historical phenomenon. The turn in
Heidegger’s thought is perhaps best captured by David Krell, whose accurate analysis of the
turn, as something other than a drastic event in which Heidegger changed his philosophical topic
outright, emphasizes precisely the issues forming the content of this essay:
If there were a dramatic ‘turn’ of this sort in Heidegger career of thought (and I underscore the
‘if’ and embrace the subjunctive), then it would be a turn, not from man to being, but from the
natural designation of Da-sein to homo humanus, to der Mensch, die Sterblichen, in other words,
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a turn from Being to man [humankind].7
II. Heidegger’s Being and Time: The Problem of “Historicality” and the Subject-Centered
Model of Dasein:
In Division II, Chapter 5, Section 74 (The Basic Constitution of Historicality) of Being
and Time, Heidegger presents his most authoritative rendering of Dasein’s authentic existence,
the moment of displacement that occurs as the open, resolute Dasein, running ahead to its death
as thrown-projection, enacts its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Significantly, in this section,
Heidegger reinterprets Dasein’s authenticity, providing an analysis of Dasein in terms of its role
as a legitimate historical being. Envisaging Dasein as Being-towards-death, Heidegger describes
Dasein’s authentic worldly comportment, which is a running ahead in resolute openness
(Vorlaufen) to its own death (which Dasein acknowledges) in terms of temporality and
“historicality,” a moment of “authentic resoluteness in which Dasein hands itself down to itself,
free for death in a possibility it has inherited and chosen.”8 According to Heidegger, historicality
is the living event of Dasein’s freedom and happens in praxis as Dasein fatefully enacts its
destiny, which entails Dasein taking up and projecting futurally the heritage that has been handed
down from its forebears. Historicality involves Dasein accepting responsibility for living out the
choices and decisions passed along through its heritage. Heidegger claims that historicality
culminates in Dasein’s “authentic” destiny, as the essential mode of Being-with-others as Beingin-the-world.
Heidegger works to convey the notion of destiny as the occurrence of a single historical
happening, in a world that Dasein communally inhabits, shares, and in many ways creates
through ecumenical comportment. This foregoing analysis encapsulates Heidegger’s thinking on
authentic Dasein in relation to its authentic destiny, and he curiously refrains from a detailed
treatment of this phenomenon, which appears to represent the culmination of his thinking on
Dasein’s fateful historicality, or the totality of Dasein’s existence as a legitimate communal
being. Despite the ambiguous nature of Heidegger’s presentation of historicality, it is clear that
in Being and Time he is not conceiving Dasein’s destiny (its authentic historicality) as merely
representing the collective fates of disparate and isolated individuals. Rather, Heidegger
explicitly states that destiny is not “something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any
more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as occurring together of several subjects.”9
However, it is certainly arguable whether or not Heidegger achieves this aim of presenting
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Dasein in Being and Time in terms of a legitimate communal being. Heidegger’s treatment of
Dasein’s authentic historicality in 1927, in terms of “heritage,” “fate,” and “destiny,” is highly
problematic for several important reasons, and these problematic issues relate to the “subjectcentered” model of Dasein that emerges from Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Being and
Time.
Moving to analyze Heidegger’s overcoming of traditional metaphysics, I examine the
problem with “historicality” in Being and Time as related specifically to the following three
issues: (1) The notion of Dasein’s Time in relation to “originary” Temporality; (2) The
understanding of Dasein as the sole disclosure site of Being, or the occurrence of aletheia
(unconcealedness), and (3) The issue of Dasein’s “individuation” for its own death along with
the notion of Dasein’s “owned” possibilities. This latter issue, being the focus of this essay, will
receive the most detailed treatment, for according to William McNeill, it literally “haunts”
Heidegger’s 1927 interpretation of historicality in Being and Time. One way in which the
subject-centered model of Dasein can be understood is in terms of time, or temporality.
Heidegger reasons that the “care-structure” represents the Being of Dasein, and, as he makes
explicit, “[T]ime is the transcendental horizon of the question of Being.”10 This notion of
“transcendental” knowledge in Being and Time suggests that it is Dasein’s inherent way of being
structured, as “care,” that allows for the potential interpretation of Being in a way that is
fundamentally linked to a single entity. This appears to suggest that the existential make-up of
Dasein holds a privileged status over Being (and the question of Being), as if the “care-structure”
held the potential to organize, control, and fix the boundaries of Being’s meaning.
These problems stem from the limitations that the metaphysical conceptual-linguistic
schema imposes on Heidegger’s philosophy of 1927. Daniela Vallega-Neu recognizes
Heidegger’s bold attempts to de-structure the language and conceptual structure of traditional
metaphysics, but suggests that more often than not, due to the way in which we have been
attuned to understand and discourse about philosophy, Heidegger’s radical reworking of certain
ideas lend themselves to misinterpretation. Importantly, Vallega-Nue argues that the notion of
Being-towards-death as related to temporality gives the impression that Heidegger is in fact
presenting Dasein in terms of a subject-centered model of the human, which gives rise to the
problem with the attempt to approach the understanding of Being qua Being by means of
Dasein’s “transcendence” and its finite temporal (horizon) structure as the singular site by and
through which Being might be understood. If, as Heidegger claims, time is the horizon for
understanding Being, then there is a problem with conceiving Dasein’s finite temporal structure
as a possible means by which to acquire this understanding. As Vallega-Nue points out, in order
to understand Being, we must conclude that “temporality is the condition for the possibility of
being of such, which is [also] the condition for the possibility of Dasein.”11 Vallega-Nue
10

11

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 436/384.

Daniela Vallega-Neu, “Poietic Saying,” from Companion to Heidegger’s
Contributions to Philosophy, 67.

suggests that this fundamental structure for approaching Being - by way of Dasein’s temporality
- “dissolves” in several ways if we examine finite temporality as disclosed in Dasein’s Beingtowards-death.
It dissolves if we think that the temporality of being as such (the sense of being) is
disclosed in Dasein’s being towards death, i.e., in Dasein’s temporality and not beyond it
or in distinction to it. The fundamental structure dissolves also, if we acknowledge that
what serves to be an ultimate fundament, the temporality of being as such, is not
fundament at all but is rather a finite disclosive event.12
McNeill provides a detailed analysis of these foregoing issues and concludes that several
important changes occur to Heidegger’s philosophy during the 1930s, including a shift in
concern with Dasein’s temporality (Zeitlichkeit) to a concern with “Temporality ”(Temporalität).
This signifies a philosophical shift from Dasein’s “historicality,”as the temporal enactment of its
“individuated” ownmost-potential-for-Being, to the concern with world history, i.e., “the
historical destining of the world conceived as an event (Ereignis) of Being.”13 It is no longer
Dasein as willful subject, enacting its destiny by running up against death, as a possibility that is
owned, or possessed, that determines the Augenblick historically. Rather, Dasein becomes decentered in the later works, and is historical in its openness and responsiveness to Being as the
“historical phenomenon.” For, as McNeill reasons, “The Augenblick [the moment of Being’s
presencing] itself is now seen to be historically determined, not primarily by the historicality of
Dasein, as was the case in Being and Time, but by historicality understood as the happening of
Being itself, to which human actions are responsive.”14 Thus, Dasein is historical only when it
responds to the way in which Being itself happens, and as related to the work of art, as I will
illustrate, the unfolding and presencing of Being is possible through the significant (polemic)
relationship between the forces of world and Earth, the “work-being”of the great work of art.
There is also a change occurring in the work of the 1930s with respect to the potential
disclosure site of Being (and what occurs in this site). This change represents Heidegger’s move
to de-center Dasein in the later works on art and poetry. In Being and Time, Dasein is the place
and entity where beings presence and recede from disclosure, the locale where entities are
defined in their becoming the “there” of Dasein, and it is the Being of Dasein that facilitates such
disclosure. In Being and Time the exclusive temporality of Dasein remains central to truth as
aletheia (unconcealedness) in the realm of disclosure in the “open” site of Dasein. For, as
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Heidegger concludes, “[O]nly with Dasein’s disclosedness is the most primordial phenomenon
of truth attained [ . . . ] disclosedness in general embraces the whole of that structure-of-Being
which has become explicit through the phenomenon of care.”15 However, Heidegger’s later
disenchantment with the existential analytic of 1927, and his continued push to discern the “truth
of Being” as such, caused him to rethink the event of disclosure. In the later writings, Heidegger
proposes the “clearing” as a place of disclosure, or threshold, which includes Dasein, but as well,
is beyond Dasein. Thus, Heidegger shifts the focus from the Being of Dasein to the event of
Being itself, an event within which Dasein participates, an event upon which its Being is
dependent. In abandoning the thesis that one must attend to the Being of a singular entity in order
to understand the manifestation of Being as such, Heidegger turns to other paradigms that
facilitate the interrogation of the “Being event” as a historical mode of truth-happening, e.g., the
work of art, state-founding political activity, the “essential”sacrifice to an ideal, philosophy, the
poetry of Hölderlin, and Dasein in its historical capacity to be authentically communal.
At this point, it is necessary to formalize the question that will determine the path of our
enquiry: “Does Heidegger, in Being and Time, successfully reconcile his interpretation of the
temporal structure of care, anxiety, and Dasein as “individuated” Being-towards-death with his
claim that Dasein historizes in a legitimate communal manner through the enactment of its
destiny?”Addressing this question will reveal the all-important issue on which McNeill and
others have focused, the issue of whether Dasein owns its death (and possibilities) or whether it
is the case that Dasein “undergoes appropriation, understanding itself with respect to its
potentiality for being under the eyes of death, but a death [and possibilities] that is not its
own.”16 In other words, if Heidegger succeeds only in presenting death in terms of a nonrelational phenomenon, belonging to the “individuated” Dasein (as solus ipse), then his claim
that the power of death legitimizes social relations becomes problematic. Emmanuel Levinas
also considers this question when addressing Heidegger’s phenomenolgical ontology of 1927,
and his critique of Heidegger bears directly on the issue of Dasein’s authentic community.
Analyzing Levinas’ critique of Heidegger, Robert John Sheffler raises legitimate concerns
regarding the success of Heidegger’s attempt (in Being and Time) at reconciling Dasein’s
authentic relationship to its solitary, owned death with the claim that Dasein historizes as an
authentic Being-with-others.
As stated, Heidegger’s analysis of historicality, as the authentic enactment of Dasein’s
communal destiny, is grounded in the analytic of Being-towards-death. It is clear that Heidegger
is not thinking Dasein as a communal being in terms of it possessing an immutable “historical”
essence. However, Heidegger is undoubtedly presenting Dasein’s death as the phenomenon,
linked with finitude, that grounds communal solidarity. As Heidegger states, “Authentic Being
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toward death - that is to say, the finitude of temporality - is the hidden basis of Dasein’s
historicality.”17 Dasein’s relationship to its own death opens Dasein to the authentic possibility
of its time and solicitous relations with others, its Being-with-others. Heidegger is clear about
Dasein’s unique relation to death: “When it stands before itself in this way,” facing its ownmost
extreme and certain possibility of its Being, “all its relationships to any other Dasein have been
undone.”18 Death is non-relational, no one either shares, experiences, or participates in my
death, no one can take death from me, and in addition, no one can assume the burden of enacting
the possibilities which are uniquely my own.
Death does not just ‘belong’ to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to
it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation,
individualizes Dasein down to itself.19
To understand why the above statement by Heidegger is problematic, I turn to Levinas’
text, Totality and Infinity (1969), wherein he launches a vehement critique of Heidegger’s
fundamental ontology in Being and Time, which is grounded in Levinas’ claim that Heidegger’s
ontology of Being precludes any authentic thinking on the ethical, which would serve as the
original basis for any and all solicitous interpersonal relationships. There are convergences
between the two philosophical works, for Levinas undoubtedly works against Heidegger while
at once taking up residence within the text. Indeed, the main tenet of Levinas’ argument emerges
as a result of its proximity to Heidegger’s phenomenology, which is as follows: Heidegger
wrongly privileges the knowledge of Being above human ethical relationships. Levinas views
ethics as representing the primordial origin of first philosophy, as opposed to the quest for the
ontological understanding of Being. Levinas argues that by privileging ontology over ethics, the
primordial responsibility that we owe the Other, which for Levinas is total and absolute, the
solidarity that is at the heart of all authentic ethical relationships can never legitimately be
attained or experienced. In the following passage the words of Levinas express this concern:
To affirm the primacy of Being over the existent is to already decide the essence of philosophy;
it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent to a relation with the being of
existents, which, impersonal, permits the apprehension, the domination of existents, subordinates
justice to freedom.20
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This privileging of ontology over ethics, for Levinas, also holds crucial epistemological
implications for the manner in which we conceive of the world and others in knowledge, as an
inauthentic form of ontological knowledge that finds its grounds in a totalizing system wherein
difference is not only assimilated and taken up into what is the “same,” it is eradicated outright.
As Levinas states, “The relation with being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralizing
the existent order to comprehend or grasp it. It is hence not a relation with the other as such but
the reduction of the other to the same.”21 This results in privileging the knowledge of the
Others’ Being over the understanding of our indebtedness and obligation to the Other in terms of
original ethics. To assimilate the Other in knowledge eradicates any possibility for authentic
ethics, which must always consider the radical difference, and beyond this, the utter “strangeness
of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possibilities,” and this for Levinas,
is a “calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics.”22 Autonomy is not the origin of ethics
for Levinas, instead, ethics begins when freedom is restricted and called into question, namely,
by the Other who radically transcends any understanding I might have of one who is independent
of me, and this, in addition to ethics, as I have indicated, relates for Levinas to the authentic
potential for knowledge, which “is concretely produced as the calling into question of the same
by the Other, that is as the ethics that accomplishes the critical essence of knowledge.”23
Levinas does not think it is possible to refer to such notions as Heidegger’s Being-withothers in a solicitous relationship of caring, as representing an instance of authentic human
ethical interaction, because it arises in an inauthentic manner from Dasein’s relation with and
knowledge of Being, which is intimately linked by Heidegger to the notion of mortality and
existential solipsism in the mood of Angst. The problem that Levinas’ critique reveals, the
problems associated with Heidegger’s claim that we historize as authentic Being-with-others,
through an ontological understanding of our own individuated mortality, which literally opens
our authentic view to the world and others, and these concerns are also raised by other Heidegger
scholars. According to Manning, in his reading of Levinas, the only social relationships that
Heidgeger succeeds in establishing in Being and Time occur at the level of the “They-self” in the
form of inauthentic social relations that hinder, “Dasein in its solitary task of actualizing its own
possibilities,”and not, as was Heidegger’s intention, at the level of the authentic Dasein.24 For
Pittsburgh, 1969), 45-7.
21
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Heidegger, social relations are either inauthentic or authentic, and it is Dasein’s authentic
existence that begins and ends, according to Manning, at the level of the solitary Dasein, when
anxiety (Angst) individualizes Dasein as solus ipse. As Manning concludes, “Death reveals to
authentic Dasein its identity as a separate and unique individual,” and the individuation of
Dasein represents the authentic possibility of appropriating its death, which “brings it back from
its lostness in the They to realize itself as a solitary being,” and thus Dasein’s authenticity “lies in
solitude rather than in negative sociality [the “They-self].”25 For Heidegger, existential
solipsism empowers Dasein’s move from inauthentic social interactions that comprise the “Theyself,” and this occurrence is, first and foremost, grounded in solitary Dasein’s relationship to its
death, the responsibility to its own mortality.
Why should we accept Heidegger’s claim that Dasein’s responsibility to its own death, as
its ownmost possibility, guarantees Dasein’s legitimate responsibility to the Other in a communal
relationship in which the Being (and death) of the Other becomes an issue of concern?
Attempting to address this question, and show that for Heidegger death is a particular and
solitary event and phenomenon, Manning’s interpretation of death and its relation to the
authentic Dasein is rightfully concerned with the notions of particularity and subjectivity, which
he believes are present within Heidegger’s account of death. Manning interprets Being-towardsdeath in the following manner: “In addition to establishing Dasein’s authentic communal Being,
[it] reveals the essence of the future and time itself.”26 Manning focuses on Heidegger’s use of
“Jemeinigkeit,” or mineness, as the “constitutive” characteristic of death, in the sense that death
is unequivocally Dasein’s own, it belongs to the individual Dasein. This understanding of death
fails, as related to the concern of this essay, to express the universality of the phenomenon.
“Death is not only that which will someday be mine,” writes Manning, “but it is also that which
can never be mine because it has its own reality.”27
In order to argue that death represents the phenomenon that thrusts Dasein into its
authentic solicitous communal relations as Being-with-others, death must assume the form of an
ontological power that stands beyond Dasein’s own unique claims to its existence, beyond
Dasein’s personal autonomous power of appropriation. Therefore, as opposed to the certainty of
death as that which is owned by the individuated Dasein, Heidegger should have stressed the
supreme mystery of death. He should have presented death in terms of a phenomenon that can
never be owned or possessed because it is a force that is absolutely unknowable. In other words,
to argue convincingly that Dasein authentic communal relationships, as historicality, are
grounded in the ontological understanding of the phenomenon of death (and finitude), Heidegger
should have presented death in terms of the “quintessential power” that is completely external to
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Dasein. Death must represent “absolute alterity” the occurrence (and “possibility”) that
obliterates any and all notions of individuation or solitude. In short, what death must reveal “is
not my own individual authentic possibilities, but the fact that there is something other than
myself.”28
Heidegger admits that he is not successful in Being and Time at bridging the distance
between individuation and communal Dasein with the interpretation of historicality, presenting
death convincingly as the force that shatters Dasein’s individuation, making its authentic
communal relationships possible. However, this is precisely what Heidegger’s later interpretation
of death and finitude accomplishes when he moves from the fundamental ontology of Being and
Time to embrace a more poetic approach to the issue. In the later writings Heidegger attempts to
understand temporality in terms of its ground, as opposed to interrogating it in terms of the
horizons of Dasein’s experience, and following this line of thought, he links death to the
primordial finitude of the Earth, which represents the authentic power of Being and the force
which reveals and grants Dasein’s solidarity. Death traverses every individual in advance by
exceeding them, uniting Dasein in community beyond the horizon of the individuated Dasein.
Hence, death belongs to no one and at once to everyone. In the work of the 1930s Heidegger
reexamines the issue of death with a critical eye, in terms of the problem I have outlined with the
interpretation of death and Dasein’s authentic historizing in Being and Time. This point is
highlighted by McNeill in his analysis of Heidegger’s work after 1927. When discussing the
notion of Being-towards-death (as conceived in terms of finitude), McNeill writes,
[T]he finitude that was earlier conceived in terms of Dasein’s Being-towards-death, and that
could be appropriated as such, as finitude, in a moment of anticipation (Vorlaufen), is in the later
thinking of Ereignis no longer conceived as potentially Dasein’s own.29
III. “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1936) and Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The
Rhine” (1934-1935): How “Great” Art Facilitates the Truth of Being and Dasein’s
Authentic Historicality
"The Origin of the Work of Art," presented as three lectures in Frankfurt (1936), is a dense and
powerfully poetic work that offers a detailed examination of the temporal occurrence of Dasein's
historizing in the moment of the work of art. It contains, among other important sections, the
powerful poetizing of the Greek temple, an example of a cultural founding work of art, the
source of Dasein's historical destiny, i.e., its "vocation." The work of art for Heidegger during the
period after Being and Time serves as a powerful and legitimate mode of “truth-happening”
28
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(aletheuein), or movement into the open region of Being’s presencing. Art is the event of
disclosure in which Being happens and is revealed to Dasein in its historical manifestation, in
what I will describe as the Ereignis. According to Heidegger, great art represents a culture’s
founding force, a temporal phenomenon that facilitates Dasein’s movement into the work’s
revelation of truth, serving as “the origin of a people’s authentic historical existence.”30
Approaching "The Origin of the Work of Art," the following question arises: What in fact occurs
in the moment of the art work, when "great" art happens? Heidegger's response links the
authentic historicality of Dasein to the moment of history's eruption, or the "beginning" of a
historical people's entrance into their destined "vocation":
Whenever art happens - that is - whenever there is a beginning - a thrust enters history, history
either begins or starts over again. History here means not a sequence in time of events of
whatever sort, however important. History is the temporalizing of a people into its appointed
task, as entrance into that people's endowment.31
Heidegger locates the origin of the work of art in the phenomenon of art itself, and not in
the artist as autonomous creator. The essence of art lies in its potential to facilitate the happening
of truth as aletheia. According to Heidegger, art is by nature "a distinctive way in which truth
comes into being, that is, becomes historical.”32 McNeill addresses the issue of Dasein's
historicality as related to the "readiness" for its vocation as destiny. As McNeill argues, the
grounding of Heidegger's philosophy of Being during the period of the turn hinges on the
potential of great art to institute (set up) and inaugurate the moment and event of the historical
happening of Being, as a creative event in the temporality of the art work as a historical origin, as
a new beginning. For Heidegger, creation never indicates the production of that which is already
in existence, but rather "creative acts" intimate that which is "yet-to-be," that which is beyond
the horizon of the present, arriving in its approach as historical from out of the indeterminate
future. As McNeill argues, "'Historical,” with respect to the work of art, “does not mean
happening 'within' history, but refers to the kind of event that first opens, initiates, and 'founds' a
subsequent history. Such an event marks an origin, the origination and coming into being of
something new."33
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Heidegger is considering art in terms of its cultural founding significance, and culturalfounding art work acts as a paradigm for the event of truth's happening. The happening of truth is
described as the projection of truth, and all art is defined by Heidegger as Dichtung, or poetry.
However, this does not restrict the definition of Dichtung to include only the linguistic
expression of "poetry." Rather, he envisages Dichtung as referencing all creative, projective
events of truth's happening. Therefore, Dichtung occurs in many forms of art: painting, sculpture,
architecture, music, and poetry. Due to art's unique nature, it opens the space of disclosure in
such a way that it "breaks open an open place, in whose openness everything is other than
usual."34 Heidegger stresses the potential of great art to ecstatically displace Dasein from the
realm of its everyday, ordinary ways of existing by transforming “anew” its accustomed ties to
the world and Earth.
As previously stated, "The Origin of the Work of Art" rethinks the notion of Dasein as
the possibility for recognizing its own nature as the "there" of disclosedness. In the writings that
constitute the turn, Heidegger is no longer focused on a single, "individuated" entity as
accounting for Being. Rather, in addition to Dasein, Heidegger turns to other paradigms that
allow for the discussion of Being's presencing in terms of art and poetry, as modes of aletheuein.
As will be addressed, Heidegger's change in the paradigm for pursuing the meaning of Being is
related to the "work-being" of the artwork, the locus of aletheia, or vortex of “truth-happening,”
where the clashing of world and Earth occurs and the struggle between concealedness and
unconcealedness is fought. Heidegger arrives at the conclusion that the event of Being cannot be
understood from the sole perspective of the "individuated" Dasein, suggesting instead, that the
work of art facilitates the authentic moment of Being's disclosure, manifesting Dasein's authentic
relation to death in collective moments of human affiliation. However, as Francoise Dastur
argues, art as a site of disclosure is not literally beyond or transcendent of Dasein, for Heidegger
never abandons the analysis of Dasein as the "there" of the open site, but rather he shifts the
emphasis in order to understand the event of Being as it is occurring in the openness of Dasein.
Thus, the work of art is thought in its relation to Dasein as the embodied revelation of the
"conflict [struggle] that is taking place in Being and not merely in Dasein."35
In 1936, the concept of art as a cultural founding force, which facilitates Dasein’s
authentic communal relations in the form of a people’s (new) historical “beginning,” is
considered by Heidegger in terms of the historical manifestation of Being, in the Ereignis, the
"clearing and lighting" in the very midst of beings, "which grants and guarantees to us humans
the passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the being that we ourselves
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are.”36 Heidegger is suggesting that the Being of the work of art holds the power to reveal the
Being of all other entities as a whole, giving all things their look, delimitation, and meaning.
Truth happens in the "work-Being" of the work of art, as the counter-striving forces of world and
Earth clash, which is the site of aletheia, the vortex of the battle (polemos) for the
unconcealement of beings. In Being and Time, "world" represents the overarching system of
meaning(s) that organizes Dasein's activities and identity, the structure within which its life
makes sense. However, in "The Origin of the Work of Art," the world does not simply represent
the world as it is, because art does not simply reveal a world of which it is a part as just another
thing; more importantly, art stands within the unique limits that it first establishes and sets forth.
When "world worlds" in and through the work-being of the art work, a space is opened and the
work erects a world, i.e., it establishes boundaries as it transfigures the world, casting the truth of
an authentic historical existence toward the preservers, revealing the potential for the enactment
of their destiny. This "worlding of world" occurs as an event, within the work-Being, within the
Ereignis. McNeill expresses Heidegger's concept of the "world worlding," or world as an event,
in the following terms: "World is not to be understood then, as an already existing openness
within which the art work, as one particular being would then become accessible. World is rather
an event, a happening, and occurrence, whose divine processes unfold in the work of art."37
In addition to setting up a “world,” the art work also brings forth the Earth, and these
counter-striving forces are the two essential features in the work-being of the work of art.
Undoubtedly, the notion of Earth is of supreme importance in Heidegger's work during the turn,
derived from, and equated with, Hölderlin's notion of divine "Nature" (Earth). Being and Time
intimates the divine possibilities of Nature as the force that "assails us" and "stirs and strives,"38
but in "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger develops the concept of Nature more fully,
and from his readings of Hölderlin, brings forth the Earth, arguing that "world" cannot be
thought outside of its connection with Earth, world cannot exist or arise without it. Dasein cannot
dwell authentically without acknowledging its debt to Earth, for Dasein's Being belongs to the
Earth, which represents the divine-spiritual aspects of the holy, a force which Dasein must return
to in order to transform its life. Earth is for Heidegger the radicalization of phusis as the comingto-presence-of-beings in his thinking the Ereignis and the historical revelation and appropriation
of Being. The Earth represents the primal ground upon which Dasein works to establish its
dwelling, as the native soil upon which it builds its home. Earth is also the supreme spiritual
presence, a sublime, inexplicable holy force that is beyond even the gods.
Analyzing two works of art, Van Gogh's post-impressionist painting Old Shoes and the
ancient Greek temple, Heidegger distinguishes the potential for certain genres of art to reveal
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truth. This is evident toward the end of the essay when he introduces poetry, as Dichtung in the
essential sense, with its power to found Being in the word. Van Gogh's painting "speaks" to
reveal the truth of the peasant's shoes. By transporting the spectator, in the moment of aletheia,
the equipmentality of the shoes manifests, and in their Being the world of the peasant woman
shines forth, exposing her life's anxieties, the joy and pain of child birth, and the portent of
famine and death. However, although truth happens in the painting, it is questionable whether or
not it is an example of "great art," or world-founding art, as defined by Heidegger. Although it
reveals a world, the painting is not an instance of truth in terms of its historical manifestation, it
is not an instance of art in which truth opens a world and then sets that world back again upon
the Earth, and thus consecrating the ground of the historical destiny of a people.
Robert Bernasconi suggests this foregoing interpretation as one possible reading of Van
Gogh's painting. "It would seem that the Van Gogh painting," he writes, "is supplementary art,
rather than great art."39 According to Bernasconi, the painting is not so much an "origin" as it is
an example of art that "expresses a world rather than instituting one."40 For one reason, the
medium of painting is severely restricted in facilitating spectatorship (preservation). The manner
in which paintings are exhibited precludes the immediate power of mass, communal settings,
which for Heidegger is a crucial aspect of great art. However, in the second work of art that
Heidegger analyzes, the religious temple of Hera at Paestum, Heidegger describes the type of
great art that facilitates communal participation in and preservation of, because it invites the
community into the clearing of the work, into the clearing of Being.
The Greek temple is a monumental work of art that holds the potential to found and ground
a culture by bringing the participants into the revelation of Being, which is essentially a historical
event. It is because of the god’s presencing through the temple that the possibility of dwelling
historically arises from religious worship, which guides and shapes the practical and political
activities of the Greeks. As they worship, paying tribute to the god, they gather as a devotional
community, as members of the polis, members of a household and tribe with a living heritage, or
“endowment.” These intimate historical ties are authenticated within the temple’s work-being, as
it opens a world and sets forth the Earth. In other words, the world manifests, or is erected, as the
sublime power of the Earth rises up through the work in such a way as to first become visible as
Earth. As the center of worship, the temple “gathers around itself the unity of those paths and
relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and
decline acquire a shape of ‘destiny’ for human being.”41 The unity of these many and varied
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paths and relations is world, and the world of the classical Greeks represents their culture. The
overarching system of reference relations that is world includes the Greeks’ habitual practices
that are passed down through generations as ethos. It is only by way of understanding world, as
revealed authentically within the temple’s work-being, that the Greeks enter their potential to
become a nation, united in the ecumenical enactment of destiny as their proper “vocation”
However, an authentic culture is never the equivalent of merely its world, as Heidegger argues.
For as stated, the work-being of the temple not only reveals the world of historical Dasein, it also
sets the world back on the Earth, and the rising emergence of Dasein's native ground plays a
significant role in the revelation and subsequent interpretation of Dasein’s historicality. It is the
monumental and invaluable role of Earth in founding and historically validating Dasein's world
that expresses the temple’s true power to clear the ground upon which Dasein establishes an
authentic dwelling.
As the temple draws the Earth into the opening of the world, Earth is visible. The raw
“earthen” materials of marble and metal acquire a new look as they brilliantly radiate from out of
the temple’s work-Being, from out of the architectural structure. Marble and metal are
transformed within the work, and shine forth in the enigmatic recession and concealment of their
presencing. In the work-being, Earth emerges as a powerful spiritual presence, representing the
awe-inspiring sublimity of nature, which rises and exceeds humanity. Earth shows itself
authentically, in its essence as Earth, when presencing in an “undisclosed and unexplained”
manner, demonstrating the essence of existence as a self-concealing phenomenon, a phenomenon
of double concealment. The Earth represents primordial concealedness, which grounds the
secondary mode of concealedness, the dissembling in which phenomena presence in deceptively
curious ways as semblance. Heidegger describes the struggle of world and Earth in the following
poetic terms: “The world, in resting upon the Earth, strives to surmount it, as self-opening it
cannot endure anything closed. The Earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always
to draw the world into itself and keep it there.”42 This is not to suggest that Heidegger merely
equates world with unconcealedness and Earth with concealedness, for the world also has a
propensity toward concealment, and Earth toward self-showing. The double-nature of
concealedness is also connected to world, for even in the open space of the Augenblick, the
possibility of misinterpreting the self-showing of phenomena exists. Importantly, Heidegger
envisages Dasein’s existence as primordially grounded in “concealedness,” and it is because of
the Earth’s self-secluding nature, as the supreme inexplicable force, that Dasein first approaches
its self-understanding, which comes by way of measuring itself against the awesome powers of
Being (the Earth), for destiny is grounded in precisely the things that Dasein does not and cannot
know, grounded in that which is never mastered with confidence.
To review, Heidegger recognizes several problems with the fundamental ontology of
Being and Time, and as stated, these issues stem from the latent “subjectivity” inherent to the
interpretations of Dasein’s existence, the prioritization of Dasein's existence over beings and
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Being, as if Dasein’s temporality could somehow adequately explain Being qua Being as
Temporality. "The Origin of the Work of Art" stands at a crucial transitional juncture in
Heidegger's work, connecting Being and Time with his later oeuvre, due to its bold attempt to
think art in terms of its potential to reveal the temporal nature of Being as history in the time of
the Ereignis. Thus, in the later works on art and poetry Dasein is historical only when it responds
to the way in which Being itself happens, and as related to the work of art, it is possible to
interpret the unfolding of Being in terms of the significant relationship between world and Earth.
When returning to “The Origin of the Work of Art" in 1956 (Addendum), Heidegger
reiterates that great art is determined with regard to the question of Being: “Art,” writes
Heidegger, “is considered neither an area of cultural achievement nor an appearance of spirit; it
belongs to the disclosure of appropriation [the event of Being as Ereignis] by way of which the
‘meaning of being’ can alone be defined."43 According to Heidegger, the meaning of Being is
undeniably related to originary temporality as “Temporality” (Temporalität). In the moment of
the Ereignis, within the work-being of the art work, time “temporalizes,” which initiates a new
historical “beginning.” The truth-happening of the work of art induces the primordial
phenomenon of the “out-beyond-itself” of ecstatic temporality, the essence of temporality, which
occurs within the “free oscillation” of “Temporality.” Whenever art occurs as the projective
happening of truth, there exists a beginning, and a “thrust enters history.” A genuine beginning is
always a leap, which occurs as the ecstases spring beyond every being to strike open the
originary future as such, and this is the primordial thrust of “Temporality,” which initiates
Dasein’s new time as history, its new beginning as an overflowing excess. The oscillation and
momentum of this explosive temporal leap enraptures and transports Dasein into its appointed
task. This ecstatic displacement marks the entrance of a culture into its authentic endowment as
historical, and this occurrence, according to Heidegger, represents art’s historical founding as
“beginning.”
The Riss, in which the struggle for unconcealment occurs between the counter-striving
forces of world and Earth, is tied intimately to the notion of Temporality as a phenomenon that
cracks or “tears” open (die reissende Zeit) the ecstases of past, present, and future. Heidegger
explicates the concept of “originary Time,”as Temporalität, and its movement and oscillation in
the following terms: “Within this prevailing forward of that which has been into the future,
which, directed backwards, opens up that which earlier already readied itself as such, there
prevails the approach of a coming and a still-presencing (future and having-been [past]) in one:
originary time.”44 As they temporalize, the general and essential “momentum” and “oscillation”
of time is set in motion, which is characterized by Temporality’s reaching, or stretching out
toward the future, and its recession, or the movement of folding back upon itself. This notion of
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"originary time" as "tearing" or "cracking open," is a theme that Heidegger extracts from
Höldelrin's poetry. For according to Heidegger, "The poet [Hölderlin] on a number of occasions
names this time the time that 'tears,' because it is within itself the oscillation that tears us away
into the future and casts us back into having-been."45
The Riss ultimately emerges and sets itself back again into the Earth, entrusting itself to
the Earth’s sheltering and self-concealing nature. In order for world and beings to presence, the
Riss must reach out, as a coming forth, and then turn back upon itself, and within this movement
the temporality of the artwork emerges. According to Christopher Fynsk, the Riss traces out the
conflict of world and Earth, and "sets forth the openness of the open, holding open the clearing,"
within which the work of art comes to stand in the limits that it alone establishes, "standing, so to
speak, against the outline or horizon that it draws within the Riss."46 This originary experience
of Time, as Temporalität, is what first makes the authentic appropriation of Dasein’s heritage
possible, which must be projected communally into the future, thereby repeating a possibility
that it has at once inherited from its forebears and reinterpreted collectively as unique to the
Dasein of the people. The Riss is related to what has been previously defined as the work of art
opening Dasein's world in terms of a new, revelatory experience of originary creation,
establishing the context, sketching out the limits, within which Dasein first comes to stand in the
moment of unconcealedness. Heidegger writes of the Riss as the fixing in place of the strife
between world and earth so as to manifest “figure, shape, Gestalt,” and “what is called figure,
Gestalt, is always to be thought in terms of the particular placing (Stellen) and framing or
framework (Ge-stell) as which the work occurs when it sets itself up and sets itself forth.”47
It is clear that a developing concept of the Ereignis as the historical event of
unconcealedness and appropriation in and through the encounter with primordial concealedness
(radical finitude) is present to Heidegger's thesis in, "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1936).
However, this notion is also present to Heidegger's second version of the essay, which bears the
title, "Concerning the Origin of the Work of Art," presented in 1935 at Freiburg. Examining a
portion of Dastur's analysis of the 1935 essay, the notion of the happening of truth as a historical
event (Ereignis) is linked with the notion of Being's recession, or its refusal to come to fulldisclosure, for concealedness always belongs to the essence of unconealedness (as untruth is the
essence of truth). Dastur, interpreting Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus' (fragment 123), "Nature
loves to hide," reasons that Heidegger finds in this cryptic proclamation the essence of
unconcealedness, which is primordial concealedness (as Earth) in the moment of the open
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lighting and clearing of the work of art, underscoring that "the drive of the emerging and rising
of all things is to keep itself secluded."48 The work of art therefore facilitates the Earth's
emergence in its self-secluding essence, in its constant recession from unconcealment and full
presence. This notion of the “self-concealing” Earth is linked to the “hidden” elements of the art
work that always resist complete elucidation and interpretation. In other words, we will never
fully understand the work in terms that are categorical in nature. As stated by Kai
Hammermeister, Heidegger is here stressing the point that with respect to great art, “no single
interpretation will ever suffice.”49
It is crucial to bear in mind that world is conceived in relation to Earth, which is
understood in a twofold manner as representing the native soil beneath Dasein’s feet, the “earth”
upon which Dasein raises its dwelling, and the supreme authoritative force of primordial
concealedness that is always beyond Dasein, which continually rises and recedes as Being, as
history, within a variety of cultural instantiations. The historical grounding force of art, with its
projection of truth that is thrown toward the coming historical preservers must be, “drawn up
from the closed ground” of the Earth and, “expressly set upon this ground”50 This particular
concept of Earth is already present in Heidegger's 1934 analysis of Hölderlin, for as Heidegger
stresses, becoming historical does not occur through "mere settlement," but occurs only when
"accompanied by a nurturing of the Earth for the gods."51 Heidegger contemplates the
importance of Earth as related to Dasein's historicality, philosophizing the Earth in terms of
historical "ground," in relation to Time and finitude, as the Holy force that shatters Dasein's
individuation:
In the Earth's becoming homeland, it opens itself to the power of the gods [...] Where the Earth
manifests herself in the disinterestedness of authentic Dasein, she is holy - holy Earth. The holy
one, the abyss in which the firmness and individualness of all grounds retreats and where
everything yet finds its way to a constantly dawning new beginning.52
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As stated, "The Origin of the Work of Art" is an important essay in that it contains
Heidegger's developing notion of the Ereignis and the philosophizing of the "enabling power"
responsible for openness in the lighting-clearing of the disclosure site. To digress briefly,
Heidegger's central topic, as presented, is the attempt to understand how Being comes to
presence (i.e., what brings about Being), a topic that separates Heidegger from both traditional
ontology and phenomenology. Rather than seeking either the "givenness" and availability of
entities (which includes the "there" of entities in their presence) or the dative of that availability,
Heidegger questions the force responsible for the essential relatedness of these two phenomena.
This force, or enabling power, is beyond metaphysics and the ontological distinction, for the
enabling power responsible for Being's disclosure facilitates the manifestation of the "unity-indifference" of Being and beings. What then is this "enabling power"? Arguably, it is the
withdrawal or recession of Being in finitude that draws open the Ereignis, and this notion has
been linked to the concept of Earth, as radical finitude. The alternative paradigm for considering
the opening up of Dasein by the manifestation of finitude, as shown thus far in Section III, is the
work of art, which draws open Dasein's entryway into the historical manifestation of Being, thus
granting Dasein access to itself, other entities, and the Being of those entities through the rise,
self-showing, and recession of the Earth (as self-concealedness) in the truth of the art work.
Dasture gives a concise and lucid interpretation of how the Being-event, as philosophized
by Heidegger in 1927, differs from the conception of Being in terms of the developing
understanding of the Ereignis. Dasture writes that with the notion of Ereignis in Heidegger’s
philosophy of the 1930s, comes a
new conception of Being, considered as no longer as the ground of beings (this is why
from this period on [Heidegger] would prefer to use the ancient spelling Seyn) but as the
unfolding of the clearing from an abyssal withdrawal and concealment. Because man is
no longer the thrown basis of this clearing but rather stands in it and is indebted to it for
his own Being, Dasein will then be written as Da-sein, in order to indicate by this new
rendering that the “there” of Being can no longer be understood as the Being Dasein
projects through self-projection and as self-affection, but as the call (Anspruch) of Being
itself to man, a call to which man corresponds (entspricht) through thought.53
The Ereignis, as the event of Being’s presence and appropriation is Dasein’s destiny
(Geschick), and is associated directly with the event of the work of art, which initiates the
disclosure of beings in ways that assume meaning for us in a historical sense, in that it involves
our participation in the form of “owning,” or “appropriation” of what has been sent to us, or
made available to us at a particular time and geographic locale, and we have the potential to
respond to it in terms of “historizing,” i.e., taking what has been given and projecting it
ecumenically into the future as a people in terms of our collective destiny. In the Ereignis, as
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Dasture argues, a “co-belonging” transpires in the “reciprocal relation and constellation of man
and Being.”54 Being is ours, in a certain sense, because it gives possibilities that are uniquely
our own, in terms of the potential to found and ground a new historical time. Conversely, our
lives always already belong to Being. In the 1930s, it is the work of art that makes possible the
enactment of a peoples’ destiny: “Being as enowning [Ereignis] is history,” writes Heidegger in
Contributions to Philosophy: On Ereignis, “it is from this perspective that what is ownmost to
history must be determined, independently of the representation of becoming and development,
independently of the historical [as discipline] observation and explanation.” 55
The truth of art gives to Dasein its historical world and time in the Ereignis. As Dasein is
ecstatically transported to its new time and history, as the work-being delivers Dasein over to its
appointed task, a paradigm shift occurs. For as the extraordinary awareness of Being comes to
presence, the ordinary and “long familiar is thrust down,”56 and Dasein’s inauthentic ways of
perceiving and understanding its existence are reinterpreted in the light of the truth happening in
the art work. The participation of a people in the work of art inaugurates the authentic
transformation (attunement) of their existence. As they move into the truth of Being as history,
they are transported into their appointed task, “as entrance into that people’s endowment.”57
According to Heidegger, this is the founding of Being in the Ereignis, representing the founding
of Dasein’s historical existence in tripartite, linked to the Earth in three integral moments:
founding as beginning, bestowal, and grounding. The beginning, as stated above, is the primal
Temporal thrust, or leap into history, the moment in which the truth of a historical existence
manifests; bestowal is a founding in overflow, or excess, a gift which can, “neither be
compensated and made up for by what is already present and available”58 in the manifestation of
Dasein's originary ethos (heritage); and grounding refers to a people’s historical grounding,
which arises through the work as a creative response to an already existing world and people as
linked to the Earth, as the supreme authoritative force of concealedness. This change from
Dasein’s inauthentic to an authentic existence, or historical paradigm shift that occurs through
Dasein’s participation in the work of art, in an important way, as explained by Hammermeister,
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demonstrates that the “art is an indicator of self-transcendence, of the development of the self to
its utmost possibilities,”59 and these “possibilities” for Heidegger in the 1930s are poetized in
terms of Dasein’s utmost possibilities as a communal being in the revelatory moment of “truth”
in the great work of art.
This analysis has focused on the issue of historicality as a legitimate communal
phenomenon, i.e., the manner in which a people historize as communal beings, oriented toward
the enactment of their historical "vocation" (destiny). However, in the lectures of the 1930s,
Heidegger is still working to reconcile the earlier notion of “existential solipsism” (i.e., Dasein as
individuated for its own unique possibilities, including the extreme possibility of its own death)
with the claim that Dasein is historical, and therefore authentic only as a communal Being-withothers. To return to the question posed earlier, If it is the case that Dasein is its own temporality,
enacting its own unique possibilities within its ownmost-potentiality-for-Being in relation to
death, how is it possible for Dasein to historize as a legitimate communal being? This question
weighs with great import on this analysis, for not even Introduction to Metaphysics (1935), with
its emphatic claim that Dasein belongs to Being, directly addresses and resolves this problematic
issue. However, in "The Origin of the Work of Art" and the Hölderlin lectures, Heidegger
addresses this concern in a definitive manner, as he is no longer focused on death as a possibility
that Dasein claims or owns. As previously outlined, this foregoing notion appears to wrongly
emphasize the active power of willing in the process of becoming authentic and fails to explain
the legitimate role of death in the communal process of becoming historical. However, in the
later philosophy, Heidegger stresses the all-important responsiveness to Being and the resolute
manner in which Dasein runs ahead to a collective demise, a possibility which no longer belongs
to itself, but to the inexplicable, divine force of the Earth.
Returning to McNeill’s analysis of Heidegger’s philosophy after Being and Time, this
significant point is emphasized. Regarding Dasein’s originary future, McNeill writes, “The
‘power of death,’ as the site of birth and mortality, is no longer conceived as Dasein’s own, but
as belonging to the Earth in the Ereignis of its strife with world.”60 While one’s death cannot be
shared, Heidegger certainly appears to suggest that it is the collective anticipation of death that
opens the possibility of a people “temporalizing” (in an authentic moment of ecstatic
temporality) as a historical culture. No longer is Dasein the “individuated” Being-towards-death,
but is rather a being-towards the truth of the artwork as the historical manifestation of Being. It
appears that Heidegger conceives the pinnacle of authentic existence in terms of a collective
relationship to death, which is promised to no one, and yet to everyone. With this reinterpreted
view and understanding of death, Heidegger is successfully moving beyond the constraints and
problems of the fundamental ontology of Being and Time. McNeill links the originary power of
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the Earth with death, originary future, radical finitude, and the understanding of the Nothingness
that pervades Heidegger's poetic analyses.
Christopher Fynsk also analyzes the role of death in the communal historizing of Dasein. Much
like McNeill, Fynsk links the "historical address" of the art work, in the site of disclosure, to
finitude, as the primordial phenomenon that authentically unites the Dasein of a people "in
relation to the 'holy,' which occurs in terms of absence." As Fynsk describes the Ereignis, he
rightly points out that finitude is a more fundamental phenomenon for Dasein than even its death.
In the moment of the disclosure site,
the opening of Being that Dasein is called to hold open the there or 'da' of Dasein itself - exceeds
Dasein's hold. It is a kind of abyss. Finitude, understood in this way, is the limit beyond all limits
- even more fundamental to human being than the experience of mortality, insofar as the relation
to death becomes a [potential] resource for speculative mastery.61
Fynsk’s reference to the “limit beyond all limits,”62 as conceived in terms of Earth and the abyss
of finitude, is an epistemological and ontological limit that must always remain beyond Dasein’s
grasp, beyond philosophy, beyond science, beyond the various ways in which Dasein’s world has
traditionally been understood. This so-called “limit beyond all limits” is related to the authentic
understanding of Dasein’s death, or mortality, as opposed to inauthentic interpretations that
reduce death to a mere biological fact, an event that modern science can in effect “put off” for a
seemingly indefinite time span, thereby stripping death of its primordial immediacy in the
moment. The important point that both Fynsk and McNeill agree on is that the Earth and the
abyss of finitude ground, or shelter within, Dasein’s authentic death as related to the
phenomenon of Being.
In Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine," Heidegger presents death in terms of
the collective brethren of death - as brethren of the Earth. This idea is concretized in a powerful
description of Dasein’s “originary community,” the community (heritage) that is given in
advance, guided and structured by way of a collective ethos, which emerges in the disclosure site
as the originary polis, the site and locality of history. The notion of historicality in Heidegger’s
later work of the 1930s appears as a true collective phenomenon in which “each individual is
bound in advance to something that binds and determines every individual in exceeding
them,”63 and this is Being as historically conceived. Presenting the example of German soldiers
locked in combat as comrades, Heidegger poetizes death in communal terms. Much like the
preservers of the great work of art, who never experience a subjective, individual reaction, the
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soldiers are not merely a group of “enthusiastic” fighters, each enacting a singular, individual
fateful destiny. Rather, there exists a cause and a grave collective risk that precedes and towers
over the existence of every soldier in advance, bringing them into affiliation with the truth of
their mortality as a collective happening (possibility), in relation to the overriding power of
Being (and the Nothing). The nearness of death as a “sacrifice,” writes Heidegger, “place[s]
everyone in advance into the same nothingness, so that the latter [becomes] the source of an
unconditional belonging to one another”64 In these passages, Heidegger is thinking death in
terms of sacrifice, perhaps the “essential sacrifice” in which truth grounds itself, revealing in
advance the “space of that community out of which comradeship emerges.”65 There is a
collective nearness and closeness in such moments when truth occurs, and relationships are
established, but this is not the nearness to things, entities, or even beings, rather, it is a, “nearness
to the Being that is most of all.”66
Heidegger’s notion of the “originary community” in the Hölderlin lecture elucidates the
notion of fundamental ethos, as related to Dasein’s heritage and “destiny.” As stated, the work
of art “gives to men their outlook on themselves,” i.e., the inherited, habitual ways of life that are
passed along from one generation to the next as ethos. The fundamental ethos of a community
marks, or sketches out, the appropriate life for a people. Dasein’s world, its form of life, is above
all structured by an integrated system of values, revealing to Dasein what “has-been” the
accepted ways of life for the “past” community of which Dasein is a living member. The ethos of
a historical community situates that community within the change and flux of existence,
directing and guiding its “simple” and “essential” deliberations and decisions. However,
although Dasein is opened to its heritage, to the fundamental ways and laws of the past, this does
not necessarily guarantee its indebtedness or responsibility to its heritage, its originary place of
dwelling. Recall that Dasein, as thrown-projection, must demonstrate its accountability to the
past in order to historize, which is to say, authentic Dasein must honor its past, embracing and
appropriating its heritage. For this is the only way that heritage can be legitimately accessible for
projection, for a unique reinterpretation and retrieval. If an obligation to Dasein’s heritage is to
exist, and this is necessary for its authentic historizing, what is it that places Dasein under the
obligation to its heritage? What makes possible the authentic appropriation, as the resoluteness of
Dasein’s historical task, in the moment of the Ereignis?
According to Heidegger, it is the power of Earth, as a pre-cultural force, rising up through
the temple and its ground that acts as the authoritative force that holds the potential to legitimate
the fundamental ethos of the Greeks. As McNeill reasons, it is the relationship with the “holy,”
as Earth, that demands the obligation to a legitimate heritage. In this way, art plays an ethical
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role, “in the originary sense of ethos,” for in the work-Being of art, “human beings are raised
beyond themselves toward something greater, something excessive, something that prevails over
them.”67 The ethos of Dasein’s originary community is validated in the projective happening of
the truth of art, in the presence of the “holy.” As the radiant, enigmatic holy forces of the Earth
rise up through the world, world scintillates and is imbued with meaning and is worthy of
esteem, and humans are drawn together in the awesome presence of the formidable force that
reveals as it conceals, with the potential to shelter and alienate, nurture and destroy. There is a
collective understanding of birth and death that arises: humans spring from the Earth, and return
to the Earth in death. Earth is the force which, in advance, serves as the originary site of Dasein’s
“ends” - between which Dasein stretches out in the enactment of its temporal, historical
existence. As Heidegger states, "The human being, who dwells poetically upon this Earth, he and
he alone also belongs to the abyss that the Earth carries."68 For Heidegger, the notion of "poetic"
dwelling always holds authentic historical implications, but only when dwelling is conceived in
terms of the power of art and the event of “truth-happening,” as the historical manifestation of
Being, to which authentic Dasein is responsible and beholden as “communal.”
IV. Concluding Remarks: Returning to the “Turn”
In the 1930s, Heidegger considers our potential for historicality through the renewed and
intimate relation to Being that undergoes a change and rejuvenation in light of the numerous
philosophical encounters with art and poetry, a relationship bound up with the important issue of
authentic ethics and legitimate interpersonal relationships, which Heidegger intimated in Being
and Time, but was unable to think through to completion. It is important to recall Krell’s notion
of the “turn” as presented earlier, which denotes Heidegger’s thinking on the Being-event as
historical in terms of the movement from Dasein to Humankind. I have attempted to present an
interpretation of art in Heidegger as Dichtung, or the projection of truth as the clearing lighting
space that transforms the human being in such a way that our individual and communal life
occurs for the first time, a moment within which the individual’s life, in the happening of the
work of art, is no longer a life of “individuation,” i.e., the revelation of the individual’s solitary,
“owned” possibilities in relation to death. Rather, in the truth of the work of art the individual
becomes as individual when and only when authentically communal in strict relation to the truth
of Being as history, an aboriginal truth revealed and instituted by art, a truth to which Dasein is
always already “destined” in advance. For Being, as Heidegger envisions, unites every individual
by exceeding them.
It is interesting to note that when Levinas criticizes Heidegger’s philosophy for failing to

67

William McNeill, Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory,
208.
68

Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania and The Rhine,” 107.

establish a platform for authentic ethical discourse, this critique is focused on the work of 1927,
and not the “poetic” philosophy Heidegger produced during the so-called “turn.” Whereas Being
and Time does not produce a legitimate account of the manner in which Dasein historizes as a
genuine member of a community, it is Heidegger’s writing on the work of art and the truth of
Being that rectifies this problem by locating the source of history within the unifying force of
great art and the creative moment of the work of art, which affords the potential to bring a living
community into existence. Heidegger suggests that by embracing and appropriating our heritage,
as the “gift-cum-burden” of its endowment, as related to Earth, a commitment to a shared project,
or destiny, becomes an authentic possibility. Authentic historicality occurs in light of the
historical revelation of Being and the subsequent appropriation of that which in advance always
precedes, and as stated above, exceeds us, e.g., the guiding directives of ethos, our thrownheritage as revealed and bestowed by the self-secluding powers of the Earth.
It should be clarified that the appropriation of historical Being in the Ereignis does not
denote the forceful, willful taking possession of Being, in the sense of usurping something.
Rather, in the Ereignis, it is Being that takes possession of us. Heidegger is concerned with our
responsiveness and receptivity to Being, the openness that allows for an authentic stance within
the enigma of unconcealedness. Heidegger stresses humanity’s acquiescence to Being, for when
responding to the call of the Earth, we experience the Earth’s potential as a power that conceals
and shelters, as the power of the originary future. Thinking Being in terms of a historical
phenomenon in the Ereignis, as a moment of truth-happening initiated by the rise and eruption of
the Earth in the work-being, is an event that inspires our preservation of and participation in the
work of art as “safe-keepers.” As we enter and stand in the midst the work-being, "within the
conflict that the work has fitted into the rift (Riss)," we approach, for the first time, the potential
truth of our (new) historical "beginning."69 Importantly, this is an authentic communal moment,
for as Heidegger stresses, preserving the work of art never amounts to an isolated, subjective
aesthetic experience, but rather, beyond our "private experiences," the work of art "brings [us]
into the affiliation with the truth happening in the work," grounding Being for and with one
another as the "historical standing out of human existence in reference to unconcealedness."70
Historicality, as presented, is Heidegger’s response to the spiritual crisis in modern
Europe, which was (and is still) expanding to have catastrophic global consequences. As
philosophized by Heidegger, our historical Being is poetically inspired and emphatically resists
and denounces the violent appropriation of other human beings and nature. Poetic philosophizing
as understood in the writings that comprise the truth in Heidegger’s thinking Being and authentic
historicality, is the non-appropriative antithesis to the intellectualism of modernity, characterized
by its absolutist tendency to control and dominate the world and its inhabitants, resulting in a
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predicament (the loss of Being) that Heidegger first formalizes in Being and Time and continues
to struggle with into the later days of his career, a nihilistic predicament in which both humans
and the environment are reduced to mere objects, things for study, manipulation, and
subjugation. For example, Heidegger’s criticism of National Socialism in Höldelin’s Hymn “The
Ister” expresses a disdain for politics embodying this aforementioned nihilistic tendency.
Heidegger demonstrates through later writings during the turn that a new style of philosophicalpoetizing-thinking is necessary for adopting a thoughtful and poetic approach to life’s most
difficult quandaries. As opposed to reducing the work of art to the parameters of rational,
standardized, calculable thinking, the scope and methodology of Heidegger’s philosophy,
attuned to the richness of existence by way of an encounter with the work of art and the poetry of
Hölderin grows more sensitive to the aspects of the world that defy the technical explanations of
both science and traditional philosophy, and this includes the tradition of aesthetics in
philosophy.
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